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Abstract 
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides federally-funded income support for 
individuals with disabilities, and has become one of the most important means-tested transfer 
programs in the United States. Previous studies have examined the effects of economic 
conditions on growth in disability caseloads, but most focus on the Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) program. Most work on SSI dates from before welfare reform, which had both 
direct and indirect effects on the composition of the population at risk for SSI participation. In 
this paper we examine the relationship between SSI application risk and economic conditions 
between 1996 and 2010, using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
linked to the Social Security Administration’s 831 file, which includes monthly data on SSI (and 
SSDI) application and receipt. Results from hazard models suggest that higher state 
unemployment rates have a large, positive effect on the risk of SSI application among jobless 
individuals, and our evidence suggests that female potential applicants may be more responsive 
to local economic conditions than men. State-level TANF policies have no effect on SSI 
application risk but state fiscal distress significantly increases application risk. Given the 
continued growth of the SSI program, understanding these relationships is increasingly important 
and policy-relevant. 
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I.  Introduction 
Over the past 30 years, the Social Security Administration’s Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) program, which provides federally-funded income support for disabled individuals, has 
become one of the most important means-tested cash aid programs in the United States.  In 2009, 
SSI provided benefits to 4.5 million low-income adults who met its disability criteria.  These 
numbers represent an 82 percent increase in the adult SSI caseload since 1990.  In 2009, the 
Federal government spent $37.7 billion on payments to SSI recipients, representing a 127 percent 
increase in real dollars since 1990.   
A number of previous studies have looked at the effects of economic conditions on growth 
in disability caseloads.  However, much of this work has focused on the Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) program, which is limited to those with a sufficient work history, who may be 
more responsive to economic conditions.  Most research focusing specifically on SSI dates from the 
pre-welfare reform era.  The welfare reform legislation passed in 1996 had both direct and indirect 
effects on SSI participation (Schmidt, 2004), and work by Wamhoff and Wiseman (2005/06) 
suggests that “a significant proportion of each year’s SSI awards to disabled non-elderly people 
[now] go to TANF [Temporary Assistance for Needy Families] recipients.”  Understanding how the 
effects of economic conditions on SSI participation might have changed given this change in the 
composition of the population “at risk” is particularly important.   
In this paper, we examine the relationship between SSI applications and economic 
conditions between 1996 and 2010 using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) linked to the Social Security Administration’s 831 file, which includes monthly data on SSI 
(and SSDI) application and receipt.  We estimate hazard models of SSI application risk, and find 
that SSI application risk increases significantly with higher state unemployment rates.  The 
magnitude of this effect is large – suggesting that a one-percentage point increase in the state 
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unemployment rate would lead to a 22-percent increase in the risk of applying for SSI.  Those who 
began their unemployment spell in a time of high unemployment are less likely to apply for SSI, 
consistent with the idea that the characteristics of the pool of newly unemployed varies 
systematically with the business cycle.  Our results suggest that female potential applicants may be 
more responsive to economic conditions than males.   
Contrary to our expectations, differences in state TANF policies, such as the stringency of 
time limits, work exemptions, or sanctions, did not have statistically significant effects on the 
likelihood of SSI application risk.  Neither did variables that affected the relative financial benefit 
of participating in SSI versus TANF.  However, a measure of state fiscal distress was positively and 
significantly associated with SSI application risk, consistent with previous research suggesting that 
states experiencing distress may take actions that encourage their residents to seek benefits from 
federally-funded transfer programs.   
II. Background
A fully federally funded cash assistance program for the poor, SSI provides means-tested 
cash assistance to the elderly, blind, and disabled.  The majority of SSI funding is federal, but 
many states do supplement benefits with state funds. The SSI disability determination process is 
quite complicated and involves five stages through which applicants must progress in order to 
receive benefits.   At the first stage, individuals must show that they are not involved in 
“substantial, gainful” economic activity.  The second and third stages involve medical evaluations.  
Those with “non-severe” impairments or impairments that are not expected to end in death or last 
at least 12 months are denied in Stage 2, and those with extremely severe impairments are 
immediately allowed in Stage 3.  Stages 4 and 5 consider capacity to work.  Applicants who are 
able to work in jobs that they held in the past are denied in Stage 4, and applicants who, given their 
age, education, 3 
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and work experience, are judged able to work in any type of employment in the economy are denied 
in Stage 5.1   Less than half of all SSI applicants are ultimately approved (Nadel et al., 2003/2004).   
1 As noted by Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), this creates discontinuities in eligibility determination by age beginning 
at the age of 45.  
SSI is one of two major U.S. programs targeted at individuals with disabilities.  The Social 
Security Disability Insurance program (SSDI) provides benefits to workers with disabilities who are 
insured by their contributions to the Social Security system.  The disability determination process 
for SSDI is the same as that for SSI.  However, benefit eligibility requires a sufficient work history, 
and benefits are not means tested, but depend on individuals’ earnings histories.   SSDI is a larger 
program than SSI, and is growing more rapidly.  In 2009, 7.8 million workers with disabilities 
received SSDI, an increase of 158 percent since 1990.  Primarily because of the work history 
requirements, SSDI applicants and recipients are less economically disadvantaged than those who 
apply for and receive SSI benefits.  SSDI applicants are older, more highly educated, and have more 
financial wealth than SSI applicants. They are also more likely to be male, white, non-Hispanic, and 
married (Bound et al., 2003).   Many individuals are eligible for benefits from both SSI and SSDI.  
These “concurrent” beneficiaries have sufficient work histories to qualify for SSDI, but their benefit 
levels are low enough that they still qualify for SSI.  Of all working-age beneficiaries in 2004, 53 
percent were SSDI only, 31 percent were SSI only, and 16 percent were concurrent.   
While the disability determination process is stringent, there are a number of reasons to 
think that SSI participation may depend on macroeconomic conditions.  First, the SSI means-testing 
process examines family income, so if other members of the family face decreases in income due to 
the business cycle, this could lead to increases in eligibility.  In addition, there is evidence that 
suggests that rates of self-reported disabilities endogenously respond to the relative costs and 
benefits of disability program participation (Waidmann et al., 1995).  As labor market opportunities 
decline, SSI participation becomes relatively more attractive.      
A number of studies have looked at the effects of economic conditions on growth in 
disability caseloads, often focused on the SSDI program.  Autor and Duggan (2003) find that shifts 
in state-level labor demand predict changes in SSDI participation.  Black et al. (2002) exploit 
changes in coal prices as a shock to local earnings growth to examine effects of earnings on 
disability program participation.  They find that both SSDI and SSI participation respond to 
earnings shocks, but that SSI participation is less responsive than that of SSDI.  Stapleton and co-
authors (Rupp and Stapleton, 1995; Stapleton et al., 1998; Stapleton et al., 1999) find that increased 
unemployment rates associated with the recession of the early 1990s played an important role in the 
growth of applications and awards during the pre-welfare reform years, but that the unemployment 
rate has a stronger effect on applications than on awards.   
However, papers by Garrett and Glied (2000), Schmidt and Sevak (2004), Schmidt (2013), 
and Rutledge and Wu (2013) find that unemployment rates are negatively associated with the stock 
of SSI caseloads after controlling for state- and year-fixed effects.  One possible explanation for this 
counterintuitive finding is that the dependent variables used in these analyses represent the stock of 
individuals on the SSI program, but economic conditions should affect transfer program rolls 
primarily through the flow of individuals onto and off of the program (for example, see Grogger, 
2003 and Klerman and Haider, 2004). Since for many recipients SSI is an absorbing state, this 
suggests the importance of looking directly at application rates with longitudinal data. 
In addition, most of the research on SSI participation focuses on the era before passage of 
major welfare reform in 1996.  Welfare reform increased both individual- and state-level incentives 
to shift recipients from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)/TANF to SSI.  From the 
state’s perspective, because SSI is fully federally funded, whereas AFDC was funded by a 
matching grant, there have always been state-level fiscal incentives for moving recipients from 
AFDC to SSI.  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) strengthened these incentives by replacing AFDC’s matching grants with fixed TANF 
block grants.   
At the individual level, monthly SSI benefits were always larger than AFDC benefits in 
most states.  Because TANF benefits have tended to be constant in nominal terms, whereas SSI 
benefits are indexed each year to the inflation rate, the benefit differential between the two 
programs has widened.  According to Wamhoff and Wiseman (2005/2006), by 2003 an SSI award 
to an adult in a three-person TANF family would increase family income by 115.4 percent on 
average.  Even without widening financial incentives, SSI is relatively more attractive post welfare-
reform, given that TANF has stringent work requirements, time limits, and sanctions for not 
complying with rules.  There is also evidence that states and third parties have acted as 
intermediaries to assist individuals with the SSI application process (Bound et al., 1998; Livermore 
et al., 1998; Pavetti and Kauff, 2006).   
Consistent with these changing incentives, the existing literature suggests substantial 
movement of single-parent families to SSI.  Kubik (2003) has shown that states undergoing 
unexpected fiscal distress were more likely to show increases in SSI caseloads relative to their 
AFDC population during the 1990s.  Stapleton et al. (2001/02) analyze matched data from the SIPP 
and SSA records, and find that the probability of an SSI application is 2.4 times larger for past 
AFDC recipients than for other SIPP respondents.  They conclude that a large share of the increase 
in SSI participation among young women during the 1990s was due to members of AFDC families.  
Schmidt and Sevak (2004) find that state-level reforms implemented through welfare waivers in the 
early 1990s led to a 21.6 percent increase in the probability of SSI participation among single-
mother families.  The General Accounting Office (1997) examined former AFDC recipients in 
Iowa, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin who lost their eligibility under new state TANF regulations, 
and found that 12 percent of households who lost AFDC benefits subsequently began receiving 
SSI.  Wamhoff and Wiseman (2005/06) document that in 2003, 16 percent of families receiving 
TANF included a child or adult SSI recipient, and that the monthly incidence of TANF-related SSI 
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has gone up.  Schmidt (2013) finds that welfare reform significantly increased SSI participation, 
and that state policies that sanctioned welfare recipients for noncompliance had positive and 
significant effects on the SSI caseload.  In addition, Schmidt (2013) finds that welfare reform 
appears to have changed the relationship between SSI participation and unemployment rates, as the 
SSI program has become more cyclical in response to business cycles in the years following welfare 
reform for women and children, but not for men. 
The research suggesting increasing use of SSI among former welfare recipients implies that 
the composition of potential SSI recipients has changed in important ways.  Given these changes, it 
is important to reevaluate the relationship between local economic conditions, state-level 
differences in welfare policy, and SSI applications, and to understand how this varies by 
demographic characteristics.   
III. Data
Our analysis relies on survey data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) matched to administrative data from the Social Security Administration. The SIPP is a 
nationally representative longitudinal survey that collects data on a number of topics including 
employment, demographics, income, and program participation. Monthly data are available for 
sample members for up to roughly three years. We use data from the 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 
SIPP panels.  
While researchers have also used other datasets to study SSI receipt, we chose the SIPP for a 
number of reasons. First, the monthly data in the SIPP make it easier to examine dynamics related 
to employment, unemployment, and program receipt. Second, and most importantly, the SIPP 
data may be matched to monthly SSA administrative data on SSI and DI application and receipt, 
albeit fter a lengthy approval process. The administrative data allow us to observe date of application, 
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whereas data in the SIPP alone would only allow us to code date of SSI receipt. SSA's 831 file 
records every application for DI or SSI, and most decisions on that application.   
The major advantage of the 831 files merged onto the SIPP is that we can see the precise 
date of first application.  Since applicants may wait five months or many years before receiving 
benefits, but must remain out of the labor force until their application is resolved, the date of first 
receipt of benefits is far less relevant for labor force decisions.  Similarly, labor market conditions 
that affect aggregate rates of application also affect the timeliness with which state Disability 
Determination Services offices process claims, and therefore affect the average lag from first 
application to eventual receipt of benefits.  Analysis that relies solely on administrative data is 
limited by not being able to observe nonapplicants, and by the limited demographic data on 
applicants. Research has shown that using matched administrative records in this fashion provides 
more accurate estimates of SSI participation and benefit amounts than the self-reported information 
in SIPP (Huynh, Rupp, and Sears, 2002). In addition to reducing measurement error, the linked 
administrative data allow us to observe whether an individual applies for SSI at any point over a 
longer time horizon.  This is important because some individuals may not apply for SSI until after 
spending considerable time looking for new employment.  
We limit our sample to individuals who were ages 20 to 59 and newly unemployed during 
the period in which they were observed in the SIPP panel. This allows us to focus our analysis 
solely on the subpopulation most directly affected by changing economic conditions, and to observe 
them from the first month in which their experience of a change in the labor market is likely to 
directly affect their propensity to apply for SSI. 
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IV. Model Specification
We examine the relationship between SSI application and economic conditions by 
estimating a series of discrete time hazard models of program application on the monthly 
unemployment rate in the state.  These models are estimated among the sample described above, of 
individuals newly unemployed during the SIPP panel.  We consider the fact that both current and 
lagged labor market conditions should be related to one’s current employment status and risk of 
program application. To address this, we use two measures of the unemployment rate — the 
"contemporaneous" state unemployment rate in the observation month and the "baseline" 
unemployment rate in the month the unemployment spell began.  
The contemporaneous measure captures an individual’s perception of their chance of gaining 
employment. The baseline measure (while adjusting for contemporaneous state unemployment rate) 
captures differential selection into unemployment during periods of high and low unemployment. 
For example, during a period of very high unemployment, such as the recent “great recession,” the 
pool of unemployed individuals may have a greater number of individuals “higher up” in the 
employability or skill distribution. These individuals should be less likely to apply for SSI. Because 
the two unemployment rates are highly correlated with each other, it is important to include both, 
even if one is only interested in the relationship between the contemporaneous rate and SSI 
application.  
We control for the maximum TANF benefit for a family of three, as well as state-level SSI 
supplements.  These variables determine the relative monetary advantage of participating in one 
program versus another.  In addition, there is currently a great deal of variation across states in their 
welfare policies.  States vary in their policies on sanctioning recipients from the roles, on time 
limits, and on work requirements.  We examine whether these specific features of state TANF 
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policies are significantly associated with increases in SSI applications, by including control 
variables for strict sanction, strict time limits, and strict work requirement policies.   
As described above, the existing state-level fiscal incentives for moving recipients from 
AFDC to SSI were strengthened when PRWORA replaced AFDC’s matching grants with fixed 
TANF block grants.  Work by Kubik (2003) has shown that states undergoing unexpected fiscal 
distress were more likely to show increases in child SSI caseloads relative to their AFDC population 
during the 1990s.  We use Kubik’s fiscal distress measure (calculated from data collected from the 
National Association of State Budget Officers [NASBO]), and examine the effect of this measure 
on SSI applications.  We expect that states with larger unanticipated fiscal shocks will be more 
likely to experience increases in SSI applications.   
All models adjust for age in five-year bands, gender, race, educational attainment, as well as 
indicators for being married and being an immigrant.  We also adjust for whether an individual had 
low income at the start of the unemployment spell (indicator is equal to one if the respondent’s 
family income was less than twice the federal poverty level).  All specifications include state fixed 
effects.  
In our preferred specification, we also adjust for the duration of unemployment with a 
measure of the natural log of months of unemployment, and we control for time with an indicator 
for the SIPP panel (1996, 2001, 2004, or 2008). We separately estimate the hazard of application for 
SSI only, as well as the hazard of application for either SSI or SSDI (as reported in the 831 file). 
While the focus of this study is to estimate impacts on SSI applications, we estimate the hazard of 
applying for either SSI or SSDI because many of the applications are joint applications rather than 
SSI-only applications. People may apply for both, and then find out whether they are eligible for 
one or the other or both. 
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We estimate these specifications on the full sample of unemployed individuals. We also 
estimate the hazard of SSI application separately by gender and by age group (older or younger than 
age 45) to test whether there are differences across subgroups in estimated effects on program 
application. We test for the robustness of our findings using a number of alternative specifications. 
These include specifications that control for time using year or month variables; use only the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate; and estimate the hazard using complementary log-log 
regression.  We also specified the baseline hazard using a variety of functional forms, including 
duration dummies and calendar time dummies, or log duration (in number of months) combined 
with calendar time dummies, both of which produced very similar estimates for the main 
coefficients of interest.  
V.  Results 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the analysis sample. Most individual variables are 
measured in the month that an individual enters the sample. As described above, an individual 
enters the sample at risk for SSI application in the month they go from being employed to not 
employed, as reported in the SIPP. The sample is drawn from the four SIPP panels, with 20 to 30 
percent coming from each panel between 1996 and 2008.  The sample is not drawn evenly across 
the years due to variation in both the size of SIPP panels and in employment outflows.  However, it 
allows us to study the relationship between state variables and SSI application during a 14 year 
period, from 1996 – 2010.  The last period of SIPP data we use is 2010, although we observe SSI 
and SSDI applications after that date. 
Fifty-six percent of sample members are female, and half were married in the period that they 
entered the sample. Thirteen percent of the sample is foreign-born.  Respondents range in age from 
20 to 59 with more at the younger end of this range. Roughly three-quarters are non-Hispanic Whites 
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and 12 percent are Black.  Ninety-one percent have graduated from high school and 62 percent 
attended college.  Approximately one-third enters the sample with family income less than twice the 
federal poverty level. The sample statistics differ from comparable statistics for a nationally 
representative sample because of how we select the sample – it includes individuals who are 
originally observed to be employed and then lose employment during the SIPP panel.  
In the bottom of the table, we report summary statistics for selected time varying variables 
across person-month records. About one out of a thousand apply for SSI and three out of a thousand 
apply for SSI or DI in a given month at risk. Our key variable of interest, the monthly state 
unemployment rate, has a mean of 5.9 percent.   State policy variables are merged to the data by 
calendar month.   
Table 2 presents coefficient estimates and z statistics from two hazard models of application 
for disability benefits, estimated on the full sample at risk.  Column 1 presents results for SSI-only 
application.  Individual characteristics are associated with SSI application risk in expected 
directions.   The risk of application is lower for individuals who are married.   There are no 
significant differences in SSI application risk by either gender or race/ethnicity.  Those living in 
households with foreign-born individuals are significantly less likely to apply for SSI, which is 
unsurprising given post-1996 restrictions on immigrant receipt of SSI (Bitler and Hoynes, 2013).  
The risk of application falls consistently with education level, such that those with some college 
have the lowest risk, followed by high school graduates.  Having baseline family income of less 
han twice the than twice the federal poverty level significantly increases the risk of SSI application. 
 The coefficient on the state unemployment rate in the current period is positive and 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that a higher current unemployment rate 
increases the risk of SSI application.  The coefficient estimate implies that a one-percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate would lead to a 0.202 increase in the natural log of the odds of 
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SSI application. Given the mean monthly application rate of one in a thousand, this translates to a 
22 percent increase in the probability of SSI application.2  The coefficient on the state 
unemployment rate at the beginning of the unemployment spell is negative, consistent with the 
theory that the pool of individuals unemployed in periods of higher unemployment may be more 
employable  and thus at lower risk of SSI application.   However, this coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero.  The risk of SSI application falls with each additional month since losing 
employment.  
2 A logit coefficient of 0.202 translates to an increase in odds of 22.38 percent; the increase in probability is very close 
for low baseline probabilities, but declines to zero as the baseline probability increases. For a baseline probability of 
one in a thousand, we can convert the coefficient to a marginal effect of a one-point increase in unemployment rate on 
the probability of application by adding the coefficient estimate (0.202) to the natural log of the baseline odds 
(-6.09675). then exponentiate the sum to get the revised odds, and back out the revised probability (0.001227), which 
is 22 percent higher than the baseline probability of 0.001. 
The state policy variables largely have no significant effect on the hazard of SSI application.  
This is true for the variables that measure the relative pecuniary benefit of SSI versus TANF (SSI 
state supplements and maximum TANF benefits), as well as for other characteristics of state welfare 
programs like strict TANF time limits, sanctions, and work exemptions.  A higher per capita 
unexpected deficit shock significantly increases the risk of SSI application, consistent with Kubik 
(2003).   
Column 2 presents results for SSI or SSDI application.  As noted above, many applications 
are joint applications, and a large share of beneficiaries receives benefits from both programs 
concurrently.  Results follow a similar pattern to the SSI-only application hazard model presented in 
Column 1.  Current unemployment rates are positively and significantly associated with the risk of 
SSI/SSDI application, while the unemployment rate at the beginning of the unemployment spell 
now has a negative and significant effect.  Women are significantly less likely to apply for 
SSI/SSDI, which is consistent with them being less likely to have sufficient work history to qualify 
for SSDI, as well as with previous research on applications (Bound et al., 2003).  The estimated 
effect of family income below two times the federal poverty line is much smaller, which is 
unsurprising given that SSDI, unlike SSI, is not a means-tested program.   
Table 3 estimates the hazard of SSI application on subpopulations stratified by gender and 
age. Column 1 reprints our original results from Column 1 of Table 2.  Columns 2 and 3 present 
results stratified by gender (women in Column 2, men in Column 3), and some interesting 
differences emerge.  First, the effects of economic conditions on SSI application risk are stronger 
for women than men, as the significant positive coefficient for the overall sample is primarily 
driven by women.  However, the diminishing effect of months since the unemployment spell started 
is also larger for women.  The negative effect of married status on SSI application risk is driven 
entirely by the women in the sample – marital status has no significant effect on application risk for 
men.  Conversely, the negative effect of foreign-born status on SSI application risk is much larger 
for the men in the sample than for the women, as is the negative effect of attending college.  The 
hastening effect of family income below twice the poverty line is stronger for the men in the sample 
than for the women.   
Columns 4 and 5 stratify by age, where Column 4 presents results for individuals aged 45 
and older, and Column 5 presents results for those 20-45.  The relationship between economic 
conditions and SSI application risk is larger for the older individuals in our sample than for those in 
prime working age.   As noted above, the disability determination process does introduce 
discontinuities by age beginning at the age of 45, and Chen and van der Klaauw (2008) have shown 
these discontinuities to be associated with reduced labor supply.  Being married reduces the risk of 
SSI application by more for the younger individuals than the older individuals, and the effects of 
low baseline family income are larger for the under 45 age group.  However, the educational 
gradient in SSI risk is much stronger for the older individuals.   For both subsample analyses, the 
effects of the unexpected deficit shock on SSI application risk are similar (between men and 
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women, and between those older and younger than age 45).   Consistent with the results from Table 
2, most of the subsample analyses show no significant effects of the other state policy variables.   
 In Table 4, we present results from a number of alternate specifications to check the 
robustness of our findings on SSI application risk. These include controlling for time with year 
effects or with month effects; excluding the state-level unemployment rate at the start of the 
individual’s unemployment spell from the specification; and using complementary log-log 
regression.  Our results are largely similar in magnitude to the main results presented in Table 2; the 
results from the logit complementary log-log regression are effectively identical.   
The results that stray the farthest from our original specification are in Column 3, where we 
exclude the baseline unemployment rate (i.e. the state-level unemployment rate at the start of the 
individual’s employment spell).  The coefficient on the current unemployment rate in this 
specification is about half the magnitude of our original specification.   This drop-off in effect size 
is consistent with the possibility that the baseline unemployment rate is picking up unobserved 
variation in the composition of newly unemployed individuals. When it is excluded, the estimated 
coefficient on the contemporaneous unemployment rate is biased down. 
V. Conclusion 
Given the continued growth of the SSI program among both disabled adults and children, 
understanding how economic conditions affect program participation amidst changing SSI program 
composition has become increasingly important.   Using data from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) linked to the Social Security Adminstration’s 831 file, we find that 
SSI application risk increases significantly with higher state unemployment rates.  The magnitude 
of this effect is large – suggesting that a one-percentage point increase in the state unemployment 
rate would lead to a 22-percent increase in the risk of applying for SSI.  Those who began their 
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unemployment spell in a time of high unemployment are less likely to apply for SSI, consistent with 
the idea that the pool of the newly unemployed varies in characteristics with the business cycle.  
Our evidence suggests that female potential applicants may be more responsive to local economic 
conditions than men.  
Contrary to our expectations, differences in state TANF policies, such as the stringency of 
time limits, work exemptions, or sanctions, did not have statistically significant effects on the 
likelihood of SSI application risk.  Neither did variables that affected the relative financial benefit 
of participating in SSI versus TANF.  However, a measure of state fiscal distress was positively and 
significantly associated with SSI application risk, suggesting that state cutbacks could drive up SSI 
applications.   
Our results suggest the net benefits of federal aid during downturns may be underestimated.  
If federal interventions, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 2009, 
result in reduced state unemployment rates, either by averting the laying off of state workers or by 
stimulating demand, the recession-induced increase in SSI and SSDI applications could be 
dampened. Our results also suggest it could be dampened if such aid relieves state fiscal distress. 
Future research should further examine the cyclical determinants of SSI application and the extent 
to which federal aid such as ARRA or extended unemployment benefits impact application risk.  
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Table 1. Characteristics of Sample Members in Month Respondent First Unemployed 
 Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
Baseline Characteristics (n=26,077 unique persons) 
SIPP 1996 panel 0.274 0.450 
SIPP 2001 panel 0.209 0.406 
SIPP 2004 panel 0.304 0.460 
SIPP 2008 panel 0.213 0.410 
Foreign-born 0.131 0.337 
Married 0.505 0.500 
Female 0.564 0.496 
Age 20-24 0.205 0.404 
Age 25-29 0.148 0.355 
Age 30-34 0.138 0.345 
Age 35-39 0.126 0.331 
Age 40-44 0.121 0.327 
Age 45-49 0.109 0.312 
Age 50-54 0.094 0.292 
Age 55-59 0.059 0.236 
White Non-Hispanic 0.763 0.426 
Black 0.124 0.330 
High school graduate 0.914 0.281 
Attended college 0.625 0.484 
Income less than 2*FPL 0.351 0.477 
Monthly measures (n= 200,254 person-months) 
Applied for DI or SSI 0.003 0.053 
Applied for SSI only 0.001 0.039 
State unemployment rate 5.934 2.263 
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Table 2: Logistic Regression Results of Program Application Hazard 
 SSI Only SSI or SSDI 
Contemporaneous state unemp. rate 0.202 * 0.186 ** 
(1.81) (2.73) 
Baseline state unemployment rate (at start 
of unemployment) 
-0.127 -0.117 ** 
(-1.58) (-2.49) 
Log months since employed -0.348 ** -0.312 ** 
(-4.8) (-5.92) 
Maximum TANF benefit, family of 3  0.219 0.148 
(0.72) (0.78) 
State SSI supplement, divided by 100 -0.428 0.356 
(-0.79) (0.84) 
Per capita unexpected deficit shock, 
divided by 1000  
2.362 ** 1.317 ** 
(2.6) (2.1) 
Strict TANF time limits -0.299 0.058 
(-0.88) (0.21) 
Strict TANF sanctions 0.579 0.153 
(1.42) (0.55) 
Strict TANF work exemptions -0.202 -0.241 * 
(-0.75) (-1.9) 
SIPP 2001 panel -0.112 -0.085 
(-0.44) (-0.42) 
SIPP 2004 panel -0.183 0.035 
(-0.69) (0.19) 
SIPP 2008 panel -1.064 -0.783 * 
(-1.53) (-1.85) 
Foreign-born in HH -1.054 ** -1.010 ** 
(-3.96) (-3.07) 
Married -0.773 ** -0.291 * 
(-3.83) (-1.9) 
Female 0.151 -0.189 * 
(0.92) (-1.83) 
Age 20-24 -1.433 ** -2.529 ** 
(-5.56) (-11.23) 
Age 25-29 -0.363 -1.310 ** 
(-0.78) (-3.23) 
Age 30-34 -0.517 * -1.319 ** 
(-1.68) (-6.59) 
Age 35-39 -0.171 -0.835 ** 
(-0.47) (-5.01) 
Age 40-44 0.260 -0.458 ** 
(0.83) (-2.62) 
Age 45-49 0.533 * -0.098 
(1.69) (-0.6) 
Age 50-54 0.794 ** 0.186 
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(3.88) (1.42) 
White Non-Hispanic 0.177 -0.193 
(0.55) (-1.00) 
Black 0.194 -0.077 
(0.5) (-0.32) 
High school graduate -0.239 * -0.243 * 
(-1.71) (-1.66) 
Attended college -0.476 ** -0.220 * 
(-2.37) (-1.89) 
Baseline income<2*FPL 1.057 ** 0.480 ** 
(6.32) (4.04) 
N 193,450 199,870 
Note: Regressions include state fixed effects and a constant term. Z statistics are in  
parentheses. 
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
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Table 3. Logistic Regressions of SSI Application Hazard, by Subpopulation 
 All Women Men Age>=45 Age<45 
Contemporaneous state unemp. rate 0.202 * 0.253 * 0.126 0.306 ** 0.136 
(1.81) (1.74) (0.84) (2.16) (085) 
Baseline state unemployment rate (at start of 
unemployment) 
-0.127 -0.148 -0.024 -0.228 * -0.049 
(-1.58) (-1.29) (-0.17) (-1.96) (-0.38) 
Log months since employed -0.348 ** -0.380 ** -0.216 ** -0.354 ** -0.307 ** 
(-4.8) (-4.06) (-2.03) (-3.17) (-3.65) 
Max TANF benefit, family of 3 0.219 0.411 -0.076 0.523 -0.008 
(0.72) (0.86) (-0.2) (0.96) (-0.02) 
State SSI supplement, divided by 100 -0.428 -2.199 ** 2.287 -1.412 ** 1.754 ** 
(-0.79) (-3.33) (1.05) (-1.98) (2.32) 
Per capita unexpected deficit shock, divided by 
1000 
2.362 ** 1.973 2.989 ** 2.789 ** 1.845 
(2.6) (1.55) (2.78) (3.13) (1.13) 
Strict TANF time limits -0.299 -0.313 -0.275 -0.529 * -0.008 
(-0.88) (-0.57) (-0.52) (-1.66) (-0.02) 
Strict TANF sanctions 0.579 0.670 0.457 1.220 * 0.180 
(1.42) (1.34) (1.05) (1.95) (0.39) 
Strict TANF work exemptions -0.202 0.080 -0.576 -0.211 -0.300 
(-0.75) (0.17) (-1.48) (-0.38) (0.76) 
SIPP 2001 panel -0.112 0.086 -0.697 * -0.715 ** 0.196 
(-0.44) (0.29) (-1.7) (-2.52) (0.65) 
SIPP 2004 panel -0.183 0.002 -0.631 0.238 -0.544 * 
(-0.69) (0.01) (-1.36) (0.56) (-1.82) 
SIPP 2008 panel -1.064 -1.642 -0.737 -0.878 -1.302 
(-1.53) (-1.6) (-1) (-1.09) (-1.22) 
Foreign-born in HH -1.054 ** -0.669 ** -1.781 ** -1.432 ** -0.795 * 
(-3.96) (-2.08) (-3) (-3.34) (-1.71) 
Married -0.773 ** -1.050 ** -0.383 -0.581 * -1.015 ** 
(-3.83) (-4.21) (-1.61) (-1.94) (-3.37) 
Female 0.151 ---- ---- 0.308 0.016 
(0.92) (1.48) (0.06) 
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White Non-Hispanic 0.177 0.453 0.008 -0.230 0.539 
(0.55) (1.31) (0.02) (-0.6) (1.11) 
Black 0.194 0.455 0.073 -0.118 0.428 
(0.5) (1.12) (0.16) (-0.21) (0.91) 
High school graduate -0.239 * -0.036 -0.524 -0.666 ** 0.108 
(-1.71) (-0.15) (-1.53) (-2.53) (0.50) 
Attended college -0.476 ** -0.574 ** -0.393 -0.699 ** -0.321 
(-2.37) (-2.18) (-1.46) (-3.07) (-1.28) 
Baseline income<2*FPL 1.057 ** 0.867 ** 1.350 ** 0.842 ** 1.219 ** 
(6.32) (3.7) (4.37) (3.53) (5.92) 
N 193,450 122,766 63,045 59,245 128,380 
Note: Regressions include state fixed effects, age group fixed effects, and a constant term. Z statistics are in parentheses.  
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
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Table 4. Robustness Checks of Logistic Regressions of SSI Application Hazard 
Calendar 
Year 
Effects 
Baseline 
Hazard 
Dummies  
Excluding 
Baseline 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Complementary 
Log-Log 
Regression 
Contemporaneous state unemp. rate 0.168 0.186 0.108 0.202 * 
(1.61) (1.6) (1.14) (1.81) 
Baseline state unemployment rate (at start of 
unemployment) 
-0.142 * -0.113 --- -0.127 
(-1.71) (-1.38)  (-1.58) 
Max TANF benefit, family of 3 0.121 0.211 0.225 0.218 
(0.35) (0.7) (0.74) (0.72) 
State SSI supplement, divided by 100 -0.380 -0.419 -0.371 -0.430 
(-0.7) (-0.76) (-0.68) (-0.8) 
Per capita unexpected deficit shock, divided by 1000 2.050 ** 2.338 ** 2.382 ** 2.363 ** 
(2.41) (2.62) (2.61) (2.59) 
Strict TANF time limits -0.185 -0.306 -0.328 -0.299 
(-0.52) (-0.89) (-0.98) (-0.88) 
Strict TANF sanctions 0.577 0.572 0.578 0.580 
(1.46) (1.42) (1.42) (1.42) 
Strict TANF work exemptions -0.009 -0.187 -0.200 -0.200 
(-0.03) (-0.71) (-0.75) (-0.75) 
N 193,450 193,450 193,450 193,450 
Note: Regressions include state dummies, a constant term, and all variables listed in Table 2. 
Z statistics are in parentheses. ** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
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